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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence is increasingly being used in real-life applications such as driving with
autonomous cars; deliveries with autonomous drones; customer support with chat-bots;
personal assistant with smart speakers . . . An Artificial Intelligent agent (AI) can be
trained to become expert at a task through a system of rewards and punishment, also
well known as Reinforcement Learning (RL). However, since the AI will deal with human
beings, it also has to follow some moral rules to accomplish any task. For example, the
AI should be fair to the other agents and not destroy the environment. Moreover, the AI
should not leak the privacy of users’ data it processes. Those rules represent significant
challenges in designing AI that we tackle in this thesis through mathematically rigorous
solutions.
More precisely, we start by considering the basic RL problem modeled as a discrete
Markov Decision Process. We propose three simple algorithms (UCRL-V, BUCRL
and TSUCRL) using two different paradigms: Frequentist (UCRL-V) and Bayesian
(BUCRL and TSUCRL). Through a unified theoretical analysis, we show that our three
algorithms are near-optimal. Experiments performed confirm the superiority of our
methods compared to existing techniques. Afterwards, we address the issue of fairness
in the stateless version of reinforcement learning also known as multi-armed bandit. To
concentrate our effort on the key challenges, we focus on two-agents multi-armed bandit.
We propose a novel objective that has been shown to be connected to fairness and justice.
We derive an algorithm UCRG to solve this novel objective and show theoretically its
near-optimality. Next, we tackle the issue of privacy by using the recently introduced
notion of Differential Privacy. We design multi-armed bandit algorithms that preserve
differential-privacy. Theoretical analyses show that for the same level of privacy, our
newly developed algorithms achieve better performance than existing techniques.
Keywords: Reinforcement Learning, Markov Decision Process, Multi-Armed Bandit,
Multi-Agent Learning, Differential Privacy, Fairness.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are now ubiquitous in many real-life applications such
as self-driving cars, drone deliveries, customer support chat-bots, games, routing, robotics
. . . One of the most common way to train AI agents is through reinforcement learning,
in which case the agents learn by trial and errors while interacting with its environment.
As a result, by giving appropriate rewards and punishments, a designer can train the AI
agent to become an expert at any task since the goal of AI agent will be to maximize its
accumulated rewards. One of the key challenge for training this AI agent so as it can act
in a way that maximizes its accumulated rewards is the exploration/exploitation dilemma.
To understand this concept, let’s assume that the AI agent has currently tried an action
a and obtained a high reward. What should the agent do at the next round? Should
the agent continue taking the action a? This is exploitation since the agent is picking an
action it has a lot of information about. Or should the agent try another action in the
hope that it may lead to a higher reward? This is exploration since the agent is trying
an action it has few or no information about. This is a dilemma since if the agent never
explores then, it may be missing on potentially larger rewards. At the same time, if the
agent never exploits, it won’t get enough of large rewards. In this thesis, we show how to
optimally trade-off exploitation and exploration in a large class of reinforcement learning
problems.
Even with the exploitation/exploration issue resolved, there are still lot of practical
challenges. Indeed, the AI agent will deal with human beings. For example, we may
want the AI agent to recruit candidates for a job. In this example, there are lot of moral
requirements (such as not discriminating candidates based on their background) that the
AI agent must guarantee. In general, whenever the AI agent is dealing with humans it
1
must ensure safety and fairness. If the AI agent is dealing with sensitive user data, it
must ensure that its decisions do not leak the privacy of those users. Those represent
constraints on the decision that the AI agent may be able to take. In this thesis, we
consider the more restricted settings of stateless reinforcement learning also well-known
as multi-armed bandit. In this setting, we show for a two-player system how to design
an AI agent that will arrive at a rational and fair decision to both parties. We also
show how the agent can arrive at a decision that will not leak privacy. This is done
both for the stochastic multi-armed bandit where the rewards are generated from a fixed
probability distribution as well the adversarial multi-armed bandit where the rewards can
be generated arbitrarily based on a fixed memory size.
1.1 Background
In this section, we present the technical background necessary to understand the context
of the contribution of this thesis. We start by introducing Markov Decision Processes, as
well as their classification. We then introduce the problems of Reinforcement Learning
and Multi-Armed Bandits. We finish by giving an overview of well-known equilibrium
concepts for multi-agent systems.
Reinforcement learning is a sequential decision making problem, where an agent
interacts with an unknown environment. At round t, the agent observes the environment,
takes an action and obtains a numerical reward rt. The agent should take actions so as
to maximise total reward over time, i.e.
∑
t rt. The typical model used to represent the
interaction between the agent and the environment is called a Markov Decision Process
(MDP), which we describe in Section 1.1.1 below. The reinforcement learning problem of
an agent acting in an MDP is then described in Section 1.1.2, while we discuss learning
in a multi-agent setting in Section 1.1.3.
1.1.1 Finite MDP
A finite MDP M consists of a finite state space S, a finite action space A, a reward
distribution ν on (bounded or unbounded) real-valued rewards in R for all state-action
pairs (s, a), and a transition kernel p such that p(s′|s, a) is the probability of transiting
to state s′ from state s by taking an action a. At round t, a learner chooses an action
at ∈ A according to a potentially history-dependent policy pit : (S ×A×R)∗ × S → ∆A
where ∆A is a distribution with support on the actions, assigning probability
pit(at | st, rt−1, at−1, st−1, . . .).
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to the action at given the history. This grants the learner a reward rt(st, at) and transits
to a state st+1 according to the transition kernel p.
The optimal policy for a given MDP M requires us to define a more precise notion of
optimality. In the discounted settings, one care about the total sum of discounted rewards
where at round t, the rewards are discounted by a factor of γt, γ < 1. When γ = 1, this is
called the undiscounted settings. In this thesis, we will focus on the undiscounted setting.
A policy is called Markov if the action at only depends on the current state st, in which
case it is not history-dependent. It is stationary if it plays the same state-dependent
distribution at each round and it is called deterministic if it always assigns probability 1 to
some action. The optimal policy for any MDP M is always Markov, but learning policies
must necessarily be history-dependent. Given a Markov policy, the states visited form a
Markov chain. For undiscounted settings, the structure of this chain is very important and
finite MDPs are further subdivided into classes based on the chain structure induced by
different policies. MDPs are then classified in the 5 well-known classes identified below:
1. Recurrent or Ergodic: Every deterministic stationary policy induces a single
recurrent class (i.e. it is possible to reach any state from any other state after a
finite number of steps.)
2. Unichain Every deterministic stationary policy induces a single recurrent class
plus a possibly empty set of transient states (states that will not be visited with
probably 1 after a fixed finite number of steps.)
3. Communicating For every pair of states s, s′, there exists a deterministic stationary
policy that can reach s′ from s after a finite number of steps.
4. Weakly Communicating The set of spaces decomposed into two sets. Every state
in the first set can be reached from another state in the first set after a finite number
of steps under some deterministic stationary policy. The second set, possibly empty
consist of states that are transient under all policies.
5. Multichain If there is at least one stationary policy inducing two irreductible
recurrent classes.
On top of the classes described above, there is also the class of episodic or finite-horizon
MDP whereby after H steps the next state distribution is the same for every policy. In
particular, one can view the MDP as evolving in episodes of H steps whereby the initial
state distribution at the start of each episode is the same for all policies.
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In the undiscounted and infinite-horizon MDP settings a challenge is how to mathemat-
ically express the performance criteria for policies. Indeed, the total sum of rewards can go
to infinity and thus no comparison could be made. One idea to solve this issue is to define
the value (also gain) of a given policy pi starting at s as the expected infinite-horizon
average reward:
V (s|pi) , lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
[
T∑
t=1
r(st, pi(st)) | s1 = s
]
.
Puterman [56] shows that there is a policy pi∗ whose gain, V ∗ is greater than that
of any other policy. Also, this optimal gain is state-independent for ergodic, unichain,
communicating and weakly communicating MDPs. That is V (s|pi∗) = V ∗ ∀s. Furthermore,
this gain satisfies the following optimality inequality for every state s:
h∗(s) + V ∗ = max
a∈A
(
r(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S
p(s′|s, a)h∗(s′)
)
. (1.1.1)
where h∗ is known as the optimal bias function. Intuitively, h∗ quantities how good
it is to start from a state compared to another one. We called span of h∗ the quantity
sp(h∗) = maxs h∗(s) − maxs h∗(s) This is an important quantity in many algorithms.
Another important quantity for a finite MDP is its diameter.
Definition 1.1.1 (Diameter of a finite MDP). The diameter D of an MDP M is defined
as the minimum number of rounds needed to go from one state s and reach any other
state s′ while acting using some deterministic policy. Formally,
D(M) = max
s6=s′,s,s′∈S
min
pi:S→A
T (s′|s, pi).
where T (s′|s, pi) is the expected number of rounds it takes to reach state s′ from s using
policy pi.
For communicating MDPs, by definition this quantity is finite.
1.1.2 Reinforcement Learning and Multi-Armed Bandit
In reinforcement learning, the MDP M is assumed to be unknown. In this thesis we
assume that the agent always observes the state of the MDP st before it takes its action
at, that it observes the reward rt immediately afterwards. We focus on the case where
the rewards r are bounded in [0, 1].
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In the undiscounted setting, to compare different algorithm for reinforcement learning,
we can look at the amount of reward obtained by that algorithm compared to what an
optimal policy would have obtained after the same amount of time. This is called the
regret, defined below as:
Regret(T ) ,
T∑
t=1
(V ∗ − r(st, at)) .
The goal in reinforcement learning is thus equivalent to minimizing this regret. This regret
is commonly known as the (frequentist) regret. There is another notion of regret called
Bayesian regret commonly used by Bayesian algorithms. To understand Bayesian regret,
let’s first observe that since the true MDP is unknown, Bayesian methods start with a
prior distribution for the unknown MDP and compute a posterior distribution with more
data collected using Bayes theorem. The Bayesian regret can be viewed as the expected
frequentist regret under the assumption that the true unknown MDP comes from the
prior. More precisely, the Bayesian setting assumes that the true MDP is in some set
M = {Mθ | θ ∈ Θ } parameterized by θ, over which a prior probability distribution P is
defined. And the Bayesian Regret for a policy pi is defined as:
BRegret(T ) =
∫
Θ
EpiMθ Regret(T ) dP(θ). (1.1.2)
Unless otherwise specified, in this thesis we used regret to mean the frequentist regret.
The minimax regret is a worst-case problem independent regret. To find it, one designs
a worst-case MDP and shows that under this MDP, no algorithms can obtain a regret
smaller than a specific value. More precisely, the minimax regret is defined by:
min
pi∈Π
max
M∈M
EpiM Regret(T ).
When the MDP consists of a single state, the corresponding reinforcement learning
problem is known as the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem.
1.1.3 Multi-Agent Learning
The extension of MDP to multiple players is known as stochastic game or Markov game.
A finite stochastic game consists of a finite set of players N , a finite state space S, a
finite set of joint-actions A = ∏|N |i=1Ai with Ai the set of actions available for player i. At
each round t, from the state st the players simultaneously take actions at = a1t , . . . a
|N |
t
where ait is the action taken by player i. Each player i then receives a numerical reward
5
ri(st, at) sampled from some probability distribution depending only on the current state
st and the joint action at. Then, the system transits to a new state st+1 according to
a probability distribution that depends only on (st, at). We say that the rewards are
deterministic if given a state st, a joint-action at and a player i, the reward ri(st, at) is
always the same value. If this is not the case, then we say that the rewards are stochastic.
Stochastic games with a single-state are known as repeated (general sum) games. If
the rewards are deterministic and always sum to zero at each round t, the end of the
game, then the game is known as being zero-sum. If the game only lasts for 1 round, it is
known as single-stage or one-shot game.
Most of the literature relating to games consider only deterministic rewards. Similarly
to MDPs, players act through policies. When the policy is deterministic stationary this
is known as a strategy in the game theory literature. A strategy profile is a list of |N |
strategies, one for each player. Given a strategy profile, each player can compute their
expected long-term rewards. Just as in MDPs, this is called the value. Each player would
like to maximize their own value.
While from the point of view of one player, maximising total utility might be a
reasonable goal, as players can reason about how other players might act, there may not
exist a strategy that is optimal in the single-agent sense. For that reason, alternative
solutions concepts have been developed, such as the well-known Nash Equilibrium [48]. A
strategy profile is said to be a Nash Equilibrium if no players can change its strategy in
the profile and increase its value as far as the other players do not change their strategies
in the profile.
Another important class of solutions concept is that of maximin. Informally, the
maximin is the largest value that a player can guarantee regardless of the policies of the
other players, i.e. where it assumes that all the other players are acting as a coalition
against him in a zero-sum game. Similarly, the minimax is the smallest value the other
players can force a specific player to have regardless of its policy.
In this thesis, we are instead targeting another solution concept, which is more closely
related to reinforcement learning and multi-armed bandit problems, the Egalitarian
Bargaining Solution whereby through cooperation players can increase their value.
1.2 Thesis outline
In the remainder of this chapter, we detail our main contributions, then we review the
related literature. We finish this chapter with concluding remarks. In Chapter 2, we
present in details our article that introduced a novel optimistic algorithm, UCRL-V for
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communicating Markov Decision Process. Chapter 3 extends the results from Chapter 2 to
the Bayesian viewpoint. In particular, we present two algorithms BUCRL and TSUCRL
that respectively uses the quantile and the sampled order statistics of the posterior
distribution to derive confidence bounds to use when solving the MDP. Chapter 4 detailed
our work on multi-agent multi-armed bandit and proposes a novel objective: Egalitarian
Bargaining Solution. We also present an algorithm that can achieve this objective.
1.3 Contributions
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We derive a computationally efficient optimistic algorithm, UCRL-V, for communi-
cating MDP that achieves O˜(√DSAT )1 regret closing a gap in the literature. Our
theoretical analysis is generic and can be applied to other algorithms. Experiments
conducted confirmed our theoretical results ([66] and re-printed in Chapter 2).
• We derive the first computationally efficient Bayesian algorithms, BUCRL and
TSUCRL, for communicating MDP that achieve the optimal regret O˜(√DSAT ) up
to logarithmic factors ([67] and re-printed in Chapter 3).
• We propose a novel objective (the Egalitarian Bargaining Solution) to aim for
in multi-agent multi-armed bandit. We also proposed an equivalent notion of
individually rational regret. We propose an algorithm UCRG that achieves the
near-optimal regret in this settings. We can conclude that the achieved regret is
near-optimal since we demonstrated a matching lower bound ([68] and re-printed in
Chapter 4).
• We design differential private multi-armed bandit algorithm that improved the
regret suffered for ensuring a fixed  privacy loss from O˜(T 2/3/) to O˜(√T/)
(Chapters 5 and 6).
1.4 Related work
In this section, we review the literature which we categorized as related to optimistic
reinforcement learning, posterior sampling for reinforcement learning and multi-agent
learning.
1O˜ is used to hide log factors
7
Optimistic algorithms Jaksch, Ortner, and Auer [31] were one of the first to propose
an algorithm for the general communicating MDP with undiscounted reward. They
introduce an algorithm named UCRL2 and demonstrate an upper bound of O(DS√TA)
on the regret. It is important to note that UCRL2 never uses any information about the
true diameter D. UCRL2 works by constructing adaptive episodes. The criteria used to
construct a new episode is named doubling trick. Within an episode, UCRL2 builds a
set of statistically plausible MDPs and finds within that set, an MDP and its optimal
policy (called optimistic policy) such that the value of that optimistic policy is close to
the largest value attainable for any other MDP in the set. This step is called optimism
and is the reason why the method is called optimism in the face of uncertainty. The
algorithm used to find this optimistic policy is called extended value iteration. Jaksch,
Ortner, and Auer [31] show that their result can be improved since they prove a lower
bound of Ω(
√
DSAT ) on the regret. They also derived a nice and intuitive analysis that
turned out to become the backbone of future analysis.
Filippi, Cappé, and Garivier [24] derive an algorithm named KL-UCRL that follows the
same structure as UCRL2. Their main modification comes from how the set of statistically
plausible MDPs is constructed. More precisely, instead of relying on Weissman to create a
bound on the transitions they used a confidence interval based on KL-divergence. Because
of this modification, KL-UCRL modifies how to find the optimistic policy. In particular,
to find the MDP whose optimal policy leads to an optimistic policy, KL-UCRL solves
a convex maximization over a ball using Newton-Raphson algorithm. Theoretically,
KL-UCRL does not improve on the upper bound of the regret compared to UCRL2.
However, Filippi, Cappé, and Garivier [24] found that in practice, KL-UCRL performs
much better than UCRL2.
Talebi and Maillard [64] proposes an improved regret bound for KL-UCRL in the more
restricted setting of ergodic MDPs. They show a regret bound of O(
√
ST
∑
s,a V
∗
s,a +
D
√
T ) where V ∗s,a is the variance of the optimal bias function with respect to the next
state distribution when following action a in state s. Their analysis suggest why KL-UCRL
is much better in practice than UCRL2. Indeed, for some MDPs this variance term is
much lower than D2SA. However, in the worst-case it could reach D2SA and thus the
result of Talebi and Maillard [64] does not provide any improvement.
There have been also some papers that attempted to improve the dependency on
D and instead have a dependency on sp(h∗) which is always a much smaller quantity.
Although the lower bound of Jaksch, Ortner, and Auer [31] shows a dependency on D, it
uses a worst-case MDP where sp(h∗) and D are within a constant factor of each other.
This has generated a lot of discussion [25] in the literature to know whether or not the
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"true" lower bound should depend sp(h∗) rather than D. The intuition was “While the
diameter D quantifies the number of steps needed to "recover" from a bad state in the
worst case, the actual regret incurred while "recovering" is related to the difference in
potential reward between "bad" and "good" states, which is accurately measured by the
span (i.e., the range) sp(h∗) of the optimal bias function. While the diameter is an upper
bound on the optimal bias span, it could be arbitrarily larger (e.g., weakly-communicating
MDPs may have finite span and infinite diameter) thus suggesting that algorithms whose
regret scales with the span may perform significantly better.”
Bartlett and Tewari [9] proposed the Regal algorithm with O
(
sp(h∗)S
√
TA
)
. However,
not only their algorithm is not efficiently implementable it requires the knowledge of the
true sp(h∗). Although Bartlett and Tewari [9] presented two more algorithms Regal.C and
Regal.D that only need an upper bound (such as D) on sp(h∗), their algorithm remains
not efficiently implementable. This is because instead of finding the policy maximizing
the gain in the set of statistically plausible MDPs (something that can be done efficiently
using extended value iteration), Bartlett and Tewari [9] use an additional regularization
term and propose to find a policy that maximizes the sum of the gain with this regularized
term. This leads to a non-convex optimization problem which is NP-hard to solve.
Fruit et al. [25] aims to pick up where Bartlett and Tewari [9] left and find an
implementable algorithm that scale with the span of the optimal bias function. They
relaxed the optimization in Regal.C and were able to provide an efficient algorithm to
solve this relaxation. Their algorithm named SCAL enjoys O
(
sp(h∗)
√
SAΓT
)
where Γ
is the maximum number of possible next states. Since their regret depends on sp(h∗) and
Γ, it provides a slight improvement over the regret of UCRL2. However, in the worst case
both regret are identical and still far from the achievable lower bound on the regret.
Azar, Osband, and Munos [7] focus on the more restricted setting of episodic MDP with
known episodic length H. However, they took a completely different approach compared
to UCRL2. Instead of building a set of statistically plausible set for the MDP, they built
a plausible set directly around the optimal value function (or gain). They show that their
algorithm named UCBVI can achieve O
(√
HSAT
)
. However, this near-optimal regret is
only achieved when when T > H3S3A.
Following the results of [7], more recent works have attempted to obtain the achievable
lower bound on the regret. For example, Efroni et al. [22] and Simchowitz and Jamieson
[60] propose algorithms achieving O(√HSTA) for episodic MDP with known episode
length H. Zhang and Ji [71] show an algorithm that can achieve O(√DSAT ) for weakly
communicating MDP. However, their algorithm is not efficiently implementable as it
depends on a NP-hard non-convex optimization. In addition, their regret bound only
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holds when T is larger than a polynomial function in (D,S,A, log T ) with degree at least
2 for the terms D,S.
All the previously mentioned algorithm are model-based in the sense that they maintain
an explicit model (that is the rewards and transitions) of the MDP and uses this model
internally to obtain the policy to play. There has also been some works for model-free
reinforcement learning. In particular, Jin et al. [32] shows that Q-Learning with UCB-style
exploration can achieve O(
√
H3SAT ) for episodic MDPs with known H.
Bayesian algorithms There have been fewer results using Bayesian based algorithms
to solve undiscounted MDPs. Many of the Bayesian algorithms such as [4] only work for
discounted MDP and provide PAC (Probably Approximately Correct) bounds and not
regret bounds. Translating the PAC bounds to regret bound would lead in the best case
to O(T 2/3) regret as explained in [31].
One of the first regret analysis for undiscounted MDP using a Bayesian algorithm
is due to Osband, Russo, and Van Roy [50]. They focus on episodic MDP with known
episode length H. Their algorithm named PSRL start with a prior over MDP and compute
the Posterior using Bayes’ theorem. At the beginning of each episode, PSRL samples
an MDP from the posterior, finds the optimal policy for this sampled MDP and follows
that policy for the remainder of the episode. Osband, Russo, and Van Roy [50] show
that this computationally efficient PSRL enjoys O
(
HS
√
TA
)
Bayesian regret. Since
Osband, Russo, and Van Roy [50] paper, there have been a lot of failed attempts to
extend PSRL to infinite-horizon MDP such as [1, 2]. Indeed, [1] proposes a version of
PSRL for infinite-horizon with regret analysis, however Osband and Van Roy [51] pointed
to a mistake in their analysis. Similarly, Agrawal and Jia [2] proposes an analysis of an
optimistic version of PSRL for infinite-horizon MDP. However, Fruit et al. [25] and Zhang
and Ji [71] have pointed to mistakes into their analysis. The main technical challenges into
adapting PSRL for infinite-horizon problems stem from the fact that for infinite-horizon
one usually need to create adaptive data-dependent episodes which is problematic for
PSRL [51].
To solve this problem, Kim [36] proposes to sample a new MDP from the posterior
at each round, find its optimal policy and follow it. This process is computationally
expensive and Kim [36] could only provide an asymptotic regret (that is when the total
number of rounds tend to infinity). Ouyang et al. [54] were able to provide an extension
to PSRL which they named TSDE achieving O
(
HS
√
TA
)
Bayesian regret for weakly
communicating MDP. The main contribution in TSDE is how the dynamic episodes are
constructed. TSDE combines the doubling trick with another criterion that limits how
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large the length of an episode can grow to.
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning/Multi-Armed Bandit There is a huge
literature in multi-agent learning. In this review, we will focus on reviewing cooperative
multi-agent learning which is where we made our main contribution.
There is a growing interest in multi-agent multi-armed bandit. Many of the works
[3, 5, 6, 10, 13, 18, 23, 27, 28, 35, 37–39, 44, 45, 49, 58, 59, 63, 69] have focused on
maximizing the sum of rewards among players also sometimes known as a type of social
welfare function. The main arguments for using the sum of rewards come from the
assumption that there exists a centralized designer who want the system of individual
agents to converge to a globally good solution taken as the sum of rewards. However, the
sum of rewards may not make sense if the agents are rational since it is possible for an
agent to obtain lower than what it could have obtained without cooperation regardless
of the strategies of the other agents Brafman and Tennenholtz [16]. More precisely, any
agent can always guarantee its maximin value whereas the value an agent can obtain
when maximizing for the sum of rewards may be lower than the maximin. As a result,
the outcome is not fair to the agent that will receive lower than the maximin.
Another vast amount of works have focused on aiming for some single-stage Equilibrium
such as single-stage Nash Equilibrium or single-stage Correlated Equilibrium [8, 14, 15, 19,
61]. The majority of research in this line of works have considered deterministic rewards
and some asymptotic convergence analysis.
Others consider discounted rewards settings [26, 29, 30, 40, 41, 43, 72] using some
variants of Q-learning. Although, it may be possible to easily extend those algorithms to
stochastic rewards, they consider discounted rewards and only asymptotic convergence
analysis are provided.
Some work in this line [8, 14] provides a notion of "no-regret". We would like to note
that their notion of regret is not comparable to ours. In their settings, the rewards are still
deterministic. However, they provide algorithms that need multiple rounds to converge to
an equilibrium. Their notion of "regret" relates to how much they lose while converging.
Furthermore, aiming for single-stage equilibrium when the game is repeated is problem-
atic [16]. For example, consider the iterated prisoner dilemma game. It is a game between
two players each having two actions: Cooperate or Defect. The game is constructed
such that the only single-stage Nash Equilibrium is for both players to Defect with each
agent receiving −2 as rewards. However, both player can Cooperate and receive each
−1 as reward. In other words, by cooperating both players can receive much higher
than they would receive in any single-stage equilibrium. Acknowledging the issues with
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single-stage equilibrium, Powers, Shoham, and Vu [55] propose a new criterion which in
cooperative settings implies Individual Rationality: the average reward is Pareto efficient
and individually not below the maximin value. To this effect, Powers, Shoham, and
Vu [55] propose the PCM(A) algorithm, that maximizes the sum of rewards among the
strategies that are pareto-optimal and not below the maximin value. However, PCM(A)
only consider the case of deterministic rewards. Also, there is no justification as to why
one should aim for maximizing the sum of rewards among the strategies not below the
maximin value.
In fact, this remark is a much larger issue. Indeed, various folk theorems [53] suggest that
for infinite-horizon undiscounted reward, every outcome that is feasible and individually
rational can be realized as a Nash Equilibrium of the repeated game. In short, the set
of individually rational strategies may be infinite. So the main question is which one
should we aim for and why? To concentrate on this question and capture the fundamental
challenges, we focus on the 2-agent setting.
For 2 agents, this question has received a lot of attention and known as Nash Bargaining
Problem [47]. In a Nash Bargaining problem, the two agents have a disagreement point
(in our case the point formed using the maximin of both agents) and neither player want
to receive lower than its corresponding value at the disagreement point. The objective
in Nash Bargaining problem is which agreement should both player reach? A lot of
solutions (Nash [47], Kalai–Smorodinsky [34], Egalitarian [33], Utilitarian [65] Bargaining
Solutions) have been proposed to solve this Nash Bargaining Problem that are all based
on formal Mathematical axioms that a solution should possess. We pick the Egalitarian
Bargaining Solution (EBS) since, as opposed to the other solutions, it has been shown
to be connected to some concepts that are sought-after for autonomous agents in our
society today. These concepts include fairness, equality and Rawls (1971) theory of
justice for human society. EBS also enjoys strong mathematical properties. On top of
the individual rational criterion, it also satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives
(i.e. eliminating choices that were irrelevant does not change the choices of the agents),
individual monotonicity (If a player has better options in one game compared to another
game, then that player should get a weakly-better value in the game with better options)
and (importantly) uniqueness.
There has been previous works that also consider using solutions to Nash Bargaining
Problem as an objective in the 2-agent repeated game. Munoz de Cote and Littman [46]
provides an algorithm to find the EBS for general-sum repeated stochastic games with
deterministic rewards and known transitions. As a result, they don’t provide a regret
analysis caused by uncertainty in the rewards. Furthermore, even when applied to a
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known multi-armed bandit with deterministic rewards, their algorithm implies finding
an approximate solution using a (binary) search in the space of policies. In constract, in
our thesis, we derived an exact solution with a direct and simple formula. [42] provides
a solution for general-sum repeated games using the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS).
However, here again they consider deterministic rewards.
Since our proposed EBS is individually rational, it can be realized as a Nash Equilibrium
of the repeated game. Brafman and Tennenholtz [16] have also proposed an algorithm
that converges to a Nash Equilibrium of the repeated game. Their solution maximizes
the surplus above the maximin of the players. However, they also consider deterministic
rewards. A similar idea could be used even when the rewards are stochastic. That is
play each join-action for m rounds and then use the empirical observed game to compute
the desired policy. This heuristic is well-known as Explore-Then-Commit (ETC) in the
multi-armed bandit literature. We perform experimental analysis against this strategy
with m taken as the minimax optimal value (the value minimizing the regret in the
worst-case game) and we show that our proposed algorithm outperforms ETC.
Crandall and Goodrich [20], Qiao et al. [57], and Stimpson and Goodrich [62] propose
algorithms with the goal of converging to a NE of the repeated games, more precisely the
NBS. All of them consider deterministic rewards and only provide asymptotic convergence
to the NBS. Furthermore, Crandall and Goodrich [20] and Qiao et al. [57] consider the
discounted rewards settings. While Stimpson and Goodrich [62] only argue that there
exists some parameters of their algorithm that will make it more likely to converge to the
NBS. They do not give the actual value of those parameters and note that convergence to
the NBS would be slow.
Brafman and Tennenholtz [17] and Wei, Hong, and Lu [70] tackle online learning
for a generalization of repeated games called stochastic games. However, they consider
zero-sum games where the sum of the rewards of both players for any joint-action is
always 0. In our case, we look at the general sum case where no such restrictions are
placed on the rewards.
Our work is also related to multi-objective multi-armed bandit [21] by considering
the joint-actions as arms controlled by a single-player. Typical work consider on multi-
objective multi-armed bandit tries to find any solution that minimizes the distance between
the Pareto frontier. However, not all Pareto efficient solutions are acceptable as illustrated
by Example 4.2.1 in our paper Tossou et al. [68]. Instead, our work show that a specific
Pareto efficient (the EBS) is more desirable.
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1.5 Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
In this thesis, we presented three algorithms UCRL-V (based on optimism principle) and
BUCRL, TSUCRL (based on posterior sampling) that solve communicating MDPs and
achieve the optimal regret bound up to logarithmic factors. The main takeaway from our
analysis is the importance of using variance based algorithms for online decision problems.
Bayesian Algorithms vs Pure Optimism Bayesian algorithms naturally include im-
plicitly variance which may explain their historial outperformance compared to optimistic
algorithms. In this thesis, we show that using variance confidence bounds, optimistic
algorithms can match their Bayesian counterpart up to constant factor. We thereby
disprove one commonly believed conjecture in the field [52] in which optimistic algorithms
are thought to always be inferior. As a conclusion, theoretically there is no difference
in what can be achieved with Bayesian methods compared to pure optimistic methods.
And this remains true even when more information about the distribution of the MDP
is known. However, Bayesian methods remain more attractive from a practical point of
view. In particular, it is much easier to include prior knowledge about the MDP into
Bayesian methods compared to optimistic ones. There is a wide variety of conjugate
priors for which an analytical solution to the posterior is available. Even when the prior
is very complex one can use a variety of approximation techniques such as variational
inference to obtain a good approximation of the posterior. Availability of Python library
Pyro [12] facilitate this even more.
We also proposed a solution for one the main dilemma in multi-agent system which is
the criteria one should aim for. We suggested the use an Egalitarian Bargaining Solution
and demonstrated its superiority against competing solution concepts. We also derived
near-optimal algorithms in this settings. Finally, we demonstrate how to simultaneously
preserve differential privacy and optimize regret in multi-armed bandits problems.
1.5.1 Future Directions
Natural Extension of BUCRL to non-Bernoulli rewards Currently, BUCRL
works for non-Bernoulli rewards by performing a Bernoulli trials on the observed rewards.
We believe this is unnecessary and that one can directly use the observed rewards.
The main intuition behind this idea is that Bernoulli distribution is the distribution
with maximal variance among all bounded distribution in [0, 1] [11]. As a result, the
corresponding Binomial quantile should be larger than the corresponding quantile for any
other distribution.
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Extension of our results for UCRL-V and BUCRL from communicating MDP
to weakly communicating MDP We believe this should be a trivial extension.
Extension of our results for UCRL-V, BUCRL and TSUCRL from commu-
nicating MDP to MultiChain MDP This will not be a trivial extension. One of
the key dilemma in multi-chain is that some states may be unreachable by our learning
algorithm and yet be reachable by the optimal policy. Consider an MDP with a good
state s and a bad state s′ where it is possible to transition from s to s′ but not the other
way around. Then, if a learning agent reaches state s′ from s (for example because of
exploration), there is no way it can achieve the good value of s and will thus suffer a large
(linear) regret. We believe one of the effective way to solve this issue is to modify the
oracle against which comparison is made for the regret.
Diameter D or Span sp(h∗) Some authors [25] believe that the lower bound should
depend on the much smaller sp(h∗) and notD and have attempted to obtain bounds scaling
with sp(h∗). We believe that our algorithm may scale with sp(h∗) and not D. The only
place D is enforced in our proof technique is to bound the value maxs ui(s)−mins ui(s)
obtained after the extended value iteration. We believe that once each state-action is
played sufficiently enough time, i.e O(log T ) times, then maxs ui(s)−mins ui(s) should be
very close to sp(h∗). To play state-action that many times; we may loose up to DSA log T .
As a result, an upper bound of O˜
(√
sp(h∗)SAT +DSA log T
)
may be possible to prove.
Near-optimal pure Thompson sampling based approach Currently, our Bayesian
algorithm BUCRL avoid sampling from the posterior to ensure optimism. Instead, it uses
the quantile of the posterior. Whereas TSUCRL draw samples but used them to estimate
quantiles. A key challenge is whether one can use the samples in a more traditional way
similar to PSRL and still guarantee near-optimality. This is a significant open question
and the key challenge is how to ensure optimism. We believe multiple samples would still
be needed to avoid the policies to oscillate too often.
Extension to Function Approximators Any interesting direction would be to extend
our results to function approximator and in particular to linear or quadratic function
approximators.
Extending UCRG to multiple players We believe this should be a trivial extension
if time complexity is not an issue. However, if one desire to obtain an algorithm with
time that scale sub-linearly with the number of players, that may be more challenging.
15
Extend UCRG to stateful games An interesting extension of UCRG is to the full
Markov games settings with states. Our results about the Existence of the EBS and its
form; and the existence of two deterministic policies that can achieved the EBS value
extend naturally to Markov games. The challenge is how to design a convergent algorithm
that can minimize regret.
Using variance based confidence interval for UCRG We believe using Bernstein
based confidence bounds should lead to improve regret O˜(√T ) in many games except the
worst case games. This could be an important practical extension.
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